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Abstract
Title of the dissertation:

”A growing gap between the integrated systems on
the bridge and the end users. An approach
considering safety and risk management”.

Degree:

MSC

The dissertation is a brief investigation into the aspects of technology design
regarding the seafarer and how the training of the seafarer on that technology is
considered and carried out. The area of study is the bridge of a vessel, the bridge
team management and the technology applied on it, specially the current integrated
systems.
Aspects of how technology and automation in particular have changed the
role of the Officers Of the Watch (OOW) regarding the task they need to perform,
have been approached. Particular attention has been given to the human
characteristics when interacting with this type of technology.
Safety and risk have been superficially touched upon from a Human Factor
and Human Error perspective. Both terms seem to be important actors as causes of
incidents and accidents. However, they involve certain indetermination in what they
are or what they signify, which can serve to be depositary of other causes of
accidents which remain hidden.
Different techniques in how to manage human aspects when assessing the risk
are introduced. Industries with longer trajectories in this regard are using new
techniques more concerned with the context on which the action is performed. Still,
that is not the case in the maritime industry.
The regulatory framework in IMO, as well as in certain quality organisations,
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regarding the incorporation of integrated systems on the bridge and how is the human
aspect considered in the process has been gathered and analysed.
In the concluding chapter a set of implications are provided regarding the
findings to this investigation. Some recommendations are given to the need of a new
conceptualization of Human Factor and Human Error, as well as more specification
on the term “familiarization”. It is also recommended to make the model course
regarding operational use of IBS for Masters and OOW mandatory.

KEYWORDS: Human Machine Interface, Training, Human Factors, Human Error,
IBS, Technology, Bridge Team Management.

iv

Table of contents
Declaration...........................................................................................................................................1
Acknowledgements..............................................................................................................................2
Abstract.................................................................................................................................................3
Table of contents...................................................................................................................................5
List of Figures.......................................................................................................................................6
List of Tables........................................................................................................................................6
List of Abbreviations............................................................................................................................7
- Chapter 1 -Introduction......................................................................................................................8
1.1.-Motivation................................................................................................................................8
1.2.-General Background.................................................................................................................8
1.3.-The objective .........................................................................................................................10
1.4.-Methodology...........................................................................................................................11
- Chapter 2 -Interaction between OOW and Technology...................................................................14
2.1.-Definitions of HMI and integration of safety in its design.....................................................14
2.2.-Ergonomics and HMI.............................................................................................................17
2.3.-The OOW perception of technology......................................................................................21
2.4.-Role of the OOW when interacting with technology ............................................................23
- Chapter 3 -The Human Factor..........................................................................................................27
3.1.-Conceptualization of the Human Factor.................................................................................27
3.2.-Human error and Technology................................................................................................30
3.3.-Management of Human Error in Shipping – FSA+HRA.......................................................34
3.4.-Human error from other perspectives – CREAM & ATHEANA...........................................40
- Chapter 4 -Regulatory status of the HMI regarding technology on the bridge................................43
4.1.-IMO Mandatory Regulations..................................................................................................43
4.2.-ISO 17894 – “Ships and marine technology — Computer applications — General principles
for the development and use of programmable electronic systems in marine applications”.........45
4.3.-IMO non-mandatory regulations............................................................................................47
- Chapter 5 -Bridge Team Management and Human Machine Interface............................................57
5.1.-Bridge Team Management......................................................................................................57
5.2.-Heeling Accident on M/V Crown Princess (18 July 2006)....................................................59
5.2.1.-HMI aspects....................................................................................................................60
v

5.3.-Allision of Chemical/Oil Tanker Vessel Prospero (10 December 2006)................................64
5.3.1.-HMI aspects....................................................................................................................65
- Chapter 6 -Conclusions and Recommendations..............................................................................70
6.1.-Conclusions............................................................................................................................70
6.2.-Recommendations..................................................................................................................74
REFERENCES...................................................................................................................................76
Appendixes.........................................................................................................................................84
Appendix A (IMO, 2005b).............................................................................................................85
Appendix B (IMO, 1998c).............................................................................................................87

List of Figures

Figure 1: Integration of working situation in design (Bernard & Hassan, 2002, p. 2).......................16
Figure 2: Human performance levels (Kristiansen, 2005).................................................................32
Figure 3: FSA Flow chart with indication of HRA steps (adapted from Kristiansen, 2005, p. 284). 36
Figure 4: Crown Princess...................................................................................................................59
Figure 5: Tanker Vessel Prospero.......................................................................................................64
Figure 6: The risk Bowtie model (Hollnagel, 2007, p. 223)..............................................................67

List of Tables
Table 1: Roles of the user of technology and common errors (adapted from Dekker, 2006)............33

vi

List of Abbreviations
ATHEANA
BDEAP
BTM
CBA
CBS
COTS
CPC
CREAM
EPC
EUC
FSA
GEMS
GPS
HAZID
HEAP
HEART
HFI
HMI
HRA
IACS
IBS
IMO
INS
ISM
ISO
MAIB
MEPC
MET
MMI
MSC
NAV
NRC
NTSB
NUREG
OOW
PES
PSF
RCO
SOLAS
SSP
STCW
STW
THERP
TIS
UK

A Technique for Human Element Analysis
Bridge Design, Equipment Arrangement and Procedures
Bridge Team Management
Cost Benefit Analysis
Computer Based System
Commercial-off-the-shelf
Common Performance Conditions
Cognitive Realiability and Error Analysis Method
Error Producing Conditions
Equipment under control
Formal Safety Assessment
Generic Error Modelling System
Global Prositioning System
Hazard Identification
Human Element Analysing Process
Human Error Assessment Reduction Technique
Human Factor Intergration
Human Machine Interface
Human Reliability Analysis
International Association of Classification Societies
Integrated Bridge System
International Maritime Organization
Integrated Navigation System
International Safety Management Code
International Standard Organization
Marine Accident Investigation Branch
Martime Environmental Protection Committee
Maritime Education and Training
Man Machine Interface
Maritime Safety Committee
IMO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation
National Research Council
United States National Transportation Safety Branch
US Nuclear Regulatory Research
Officer of the watch
Programmable Electronic Systems
Performance Safety Factors
Risk Control Options
Safety of life at Sea Convention 74
Siemens Schottel Propulsor
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
Convention 78 as amended
IMO Subcommittee on Standards of Training and
Watchkeeping
Technique of Human Error Rate Prediction
Task Interactive System
United Kingdom

vii

- Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1.- Motivation
From the beginning of the studies in Maritime Education and Training (MET)
specialization, the section regarding how the Officer of the Watch (OOW) was
trained to handle the specific equipment on the bridge seemed particularly confusing.
In this sense, the training with specific technology seems always to be
included under the term familiarization, which means very little at the time of
regulating and establishing training. In addition, looking at the lack of
standardization of bridges, it is really impressive how deck officers, moving from
one bridge to another, are able to operate on the different bridges safely.
Having little experience in the maritime industry, i.e. reduced to the studies at
WMU, with a Navy background as a deck officer, the perception of the author about
the required training before being able to operate on board a specific vessel was
strongly influenced by Navy practices.
In addition to the basic knowledge that involves the operation of a vessel at
sea, the officer has to know and be trained in using the equipment before being
appointed for duty. This is the normal practice; however, besides this strict system,
problems in this aspect still exist.
Therefore, the main motivation at the beginning was to understand how the
maritime industry deals with the training of the OOW on the specific technology and
later how the seafarer is considered when the technology is incorporated.

1.2.- General Background
The 1980s was a time of big changes in the shipping industry structure. The
world trade experienced important growth due to the globalization of the world, a
growth that the maritime transportation had to follow. The vessels increased speed,
capacity of transportation of cargo and efficiency for loading/offloading operations
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reducing the time spent in ports. At the same time, the price of fuel reached levels
that had never been seen before and became a considerable operational cost (Tarver
& Pourzanjani, 2003).
In response, shipowners started to manage costs and different practices turned
to be a commonality. One of the practices was the incorporation of technology which
got more presence on board vessels changing how the work was performed by
humans and also the way the vessels were manned (Rowley et al, 2006).
At first, when the electronic equipment stepped into the navigation, it was
used as a backup. For example, OOWs continued to use astronomical calculations
and electronic navigational aids were used as a secondary mean. Radar was an
excellent tool for navigators, for which they had to learn the principles of operation,
capabilities and limitations. However, it had to be combined and cross checked with
visual bearing. The real advantage that the Radar gave to the OOWs was allowing
them to proceed safer in conditions of restricted visibility. Despite all these electronic
applications, the OOW remained to be directly in control of the vessel's evolution
(Muirhead, 1999).
After the 1980s, technology came on board taking over tasks that the OOW
had to do by himself, changing a long tradition of navigation. Bridges today are
provided with autopilot and Integrated Bridge System (IBS)/Integrated Navigation
System (INS), which deliver a continuous amount of synthesized data from different
sources regarding the situation of the vessel. The OOW has to interpret this data and
act consequently through these complex systems again. These systems can take care
of the navigation in automated mode, so the role of the OOW has changed from
being the active actor on the navigation, to be a monitor of the automated system
which controls the navigation (Lutzhoft, 2004).
Furthermore, electronic integrated systems are considered to be more accurate
than ever before (Swift, 2004), more reliable than humans and capable of providing
better situational awareness to the OOW. They make the bridge of a vessel
9

resembling the cockpit of an air plane (Rowley et al, 2006). However, they did not
substitute the presence of the human on board, only changed his task and reduced the
number of persons performing watch.
Together with the mentioned changes, came changes in the knowledge and
training that the OOW needed. All of a sudden, the knowledge and traditions of the
art and science of navigation fell out of practice and navigators had to adapt to the
new situation.
In sum, technology came on board the vessel due to economical reasons but
later, considering technology as more reliable than the human being, the
incorporation of technology had a strong component of safety in it. Today,
competitiveness add even more value to keep high the rate of incorporating
technology (National Research Council [NRC], 2004 as cited by Lutzhoft, 2004).

1.3.- The objective
Technology is being seen as a guarantee to keep a high level of safety and its
application within the maritime industry allocates a good image of the industry.
However, not always did this technology applied on vessels give the expected results
(Lutzhoft, 2004).
To justify this shortage in performance of the technology, the immediate
answer is found on the side of the users, who do not operate correctly the technology
provided (Nautical Institute, 2007). Still, the technology provided on vessel bridges
needs the presence of humans to perform as was designed, and normally it is the
human who makes a wrong input, wrongly acknowledges an alarm, misinterprets
information, and so on. But, is this shortage of technology an exclusive problem of
the user?
The objective of this research is to answer the question whether there is a
growing gap between IBS/INS and the Bridge Team Management (BTM), which is
affecting the safety operation on the bridge. In the pursuance of this objective the
10

research aims also to:


Investigate in the Human Machine Interface (HMI) concept and how it is
applied in the maritime industry.



Investigate different perspectives of Human Factors and Human Errors,
trying to find out whether the problem of the gap between integrated system
and user is included in those two concepts or is assumed independently by the
maritime industry.



Determine whether it is possible to identify clearly the lack of proper HMI
design as cause of accident, or it is normally included under Human Error.



Investigate the current pertinent regulation addressing the incorporation of
technology on bridges. Particularly, technology design and training of the
users.



To show by examples how safety operation on the bridge is affected when
there is not a proper connection between the Bridge Team Management
(BTM) and the IBS/INS.

1.4.- Methodology
The present research refers to a gap between the electronic integrated system
on the bridge and the user. This gap is identified in what is called HMI, which is one
of the main issues in this investigation, and the training of the users of technology.
To answer the question, this research has addressed how is and was
considered the user in the design of IBS/INS and under what regulatory framework
this technology is incorporated on board. Also, how the industry prepares the user of
an IBS/INS to operate it safely.
In order to identify whether or not the gap between IBS/INS technology and
the end users constitutes a safety problem, the concept of Human Error has been
approached together with the Human Factor concept. Not only how these two
11

concepts are taken in the maritime industry were studied, but also how other
industries do in order to gain a broader picture. One of the aims of this approach is to
investigate if is possible today to clearly attribute as cause of accident problems
between the technology and humans beside the well known cause Human Error.
In this research, issues related to the high turn around of crews among
different vessels have not been addressed directly. However, some mentions to these
issues are made as a reality that interfere with proper training with the equipment
installed on board.
The word technology used in this paper, was assumed mainly to refer to
IBS/INS systems. The reason for this assumption is that the provision of integrated
systems is a current trend on bridges, towards other subsystems are connected.
Particular reference will be done to automation.
This research could not be provided with data that could have been used to
clearly determine the percentage or proportion of participation of this gap between
IBS/INS and end users in the affection to safety. On the other hand, important
amount of the sources used, sustain the need of implementing further measures
regarding the link between the technology and users, arguing that this aspect is
affecting safety.
Starting with the analysis, Chapter Two is dedicated to the HMI concept and
how it is considered in different industries. It will be shown that until the end of the
1990s there was no specific requirement to relate the technology with the user. It was
a more technology centred era. Also, it describes the participation of ergonomics in
the design of technology and what the roles of the user are when interacting with
technology. At the end, one particular approach was carried out regarding the
perception that users have whenever they have to interact with technology.
Chapter Three is intended to determine how the Human Factor concept is
allocated when dealing with new technology in current days. Together with it, it will
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be mentioned the aspect of Human Error and what are the current techniques to
analyse this aspect when assessing the risk. It was studied how the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) assesses human aspects, and what Human Reliability
Analysis (HRA) techniques are in use by IMO. Since these techniques are being
succeeded by the so-called “HRA second generation techniques” (Fujita &
Hollnagel, 2004), brief approach to these will be done.
In Chapter Four a study of some relevant documentation was done regarding
the implementation of technology on the bridge. It was divided between the
mandatory current regulations and non-binding documentation. The reason was to
indicate how these two groups of documentation address the aspects of HMI and
training with new technology.
In Chapter Five the BTM is addressed in two different perspectives. One is
considering the technology and human resources together and the other is
considering only the human resources. The chapter also has two accidents in which
the lack of an appropriate operation of the technology was present. It was attempted
to analyse these two accident using the information provided in previous chapters
regarding the HMI and training aspects. Some aspects of what happens when
technology deteriorates are included.
In Chapter 6 the conclusions of this research are provided and some
recommendations are given.
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- Chapter 2 - Interaction between OOW and
Technology
These days, the OOW has to operate a bridge populated with electronic
devices. These devices take a big proportion of the task that in other times pertained
to the OOW. The OOW turned to be the person who supervise the electronic devices.
In this chapter different aspects that affect the relationship between user and
technology will be dealt with.

2.1.- Definitions of HMI and integration of safety in its
design
The first definition is from the International Engineering Consortium (IEC).
They define HMI as the area “where people and technology meet. This peopletechnology intercept can be as simple as the grip on a hand tool or as complex as the
flight deck of a jumbo jet” (http://www.iec.org/online/tutorials/hmi/). It is added by
IEC that HMI has as main purpose to make itself “self-evident”, and it must be what
the user's expectations are regarding the execution of the task with that machine.
The second definition comes from the German delegation to the IMO/Sub
Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV): “the part of a system an operator
interacts with. The interface is the aggregate of means by which the users interact
with a machine, device, and system (the system)” (International Maritime
Organization [IMO], 2007a, p. 37).
Both definitions agree that HMI is the point on which technology and human
has to coincide in order to carry out the task. However, the German definition does
not consider the user's expectations.
Other agencies have identified the aspect of integrating humans with
technology calling it Human Factor Integration (HFI). In this context, HFI is
perceived as the taxonomic use of applicable information about human
14

characteristics as well as behaviour and causes of motivation to apply them in the
design of systems. Regarding human characteristics, they involve the use of sciences
as Psychology, Anatomy, Ergonomics, Biomedicine, among others, and combine
them with those aspect of engineering and design of technology (Sea Systems
Group,2006).
Another approach found of HMI is in the field of surgery. In this field HMI is
perceived as a science that permits empathizing humans interacting with the
environment, considering the technology they need to operate and consequently
designing this technology with the knowledge acquired from human behaviour and
expectations (Savatava & Ellis, 1994).
Again looking at IMO, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) Circular 878:
“The interim guidelines for the application of Human Element Analysing Process
(HEAP) to the IMO rule-making process”(IMO, 1998c, p. 1), has another definition
of HMI. They define HMI as the area of study where the design of equipment is
analysed with the human

characteristics when using such equipment, with the

purpose of achieving high level of efficiency in the task. The document adds that
“the aim (of HMI) is to achieve uniform design and layout”(IMO, 1998c, Annex p. 7)
using ergonomics and education and training.
Furthermore, the MSC Circular 878 includes a list of five areas when
considering the Human Element1: Technical, Management, Manning, Work
Environment/conditions and Training. Specifically, the HMI is included under the
Work environment/conditions referred as Man Machine Interface (MMI). It is further
clarified that MMI is a "technical issue that has implications on the work
environment"(IMO, 1998c, Annex p. 5). However it is not included in the Technical
area2.
Among the definitions cited above, only those from IMO do not consider
1 In Section 3.1 is described what is referred by IMO as Human Element.
2 See Appendix B
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user's expectations. On the contrary, the others definitions cited have considered that
the HMI is the link between users and technology, which has to be designed
considering user's characteristics and expectations.

Figure 1: Integration of working situation in
design (Bernard & Hassan, 2002, p. 2)

Incidentally, the main reason to consider the user when designing the HMI is
to diminish to the minimum possible the probability of error by the user, which is a
safety issue. In this regard, it was found that developers and producers of technology
do not integrate the safety concept until the last part of the design. Actually, the issue
of safety is addressed at the last stages of the product' design, consequently very
difficult of doing it properly (Bernard & Hassan, 2002).
Normally, the inclusion of safety is done mainly having in mind the rules and
regulations. Furthermore, since there is not a standardized criteria in how to integrate
safety in the design stages and that normally is considered a hindrance for the
designer, this aspect is frequently addressed in informal ways (Bernard & Hassan,
16

2002).
Bernard & Hassan (2002) made this discovery using an offset printing line as
a case study. They developed a model, shown in Figure 1, where safety can be
integrated at early stages of the design. By using this model, the designers have to
imagine the instances of human intervention and undesirable events and develop
solutions. The solutions have to be weighed by the operators regarding whether the
solutions change any ergonomics aspect, or reduce visibility. This model is
applicable for any other field of technology production (Bernard & Hassan, 2002).

2.2.- Ergonomics and HMI
It has been seen in the definitions of HMI the need for designing it under
Ergonomic principles. In this section it will be mentioned what Ergonomics is, how it
is regarded today in the maritime industry, and the advantages of using ergonomics
not only in the design of new bridges, but also in the normal life of working
situations.
Wilson (2000) says that ergonomics is the “theoretical and fundamental
understanding of human behaviour and performance in purposeful interacting sociotechnical systems, and the application of that understanding to design of interactions
in the context of real settings” (Wilson, 2000, p.557).
Adapting this definition to the bridge of a vessel, ergonomics would mean the
corresponding understanding of the standard characteristics of the OOW when
operating the electronic systems on the bridge, considering the devices of the system
that interacts with the user, e.g. displays, arrangements and disposition of the
devices, shapes and types of controls and alert devices.
Nevertheless, the determination of the standard characteristics of an OOW
represents a real problem in the shipping industry; vessels can be manned by officers
from all over the world, involving different cultures, values and language (Squire,
2005).
17

Moreover, bridges are not always designed from scratch as in the case of new
buildings; updating the bridges with new technology is a normal practice in shipping.
Different brands of equipment are interacting with the user, and the user has to
accommodate himself to the different interfaces (Rowley et al, 2006). Therefore, the
intervention of Ergonomics not only in design of the technology but whenever
changes take place on board would be the best.
At first, the motivation for introducing technology was mainly due to saving
costs and technology producers were more interested in satisfying ship owners'
expectations. In this regard the technology for the vessel was more designed having
in mind what the technology should perform to satisfy the needs of the customer. In
other words, the design of that technology was more technology-centred. (Rowley et
al, 2006)
Consequently, the application of Ergonomics in the maritime industry was not
from the beginning. At first, these principles were perceived by the industry in a
negative way, as affecting the normal traditions and customs. While in the late 1990s
there was no strict regulations regarding the design of bridges, nowadays principles
of design using Ergonomics are more common. (Helm, 2008).
As a result, the maritime industry today has a public concern about
ergonomics design on vessels. Major stakeholders and international law making
bodies are using this aspect in the design of the bridge of the vessels with a relevance
that was not common 15 years ago3.
In essence, the role of Ergonomics is two fold: to understand purposeful
interactions between people and artefacts; and to design interacting systems,
maximising the capabilities, minimising the limitations, and satisfying the
expectations of the users. Therefore, Ergonomics can provide important feedback
after having provided the vessel with new technology, which would lead to further
improve future systems.(Wilson, 2000)
3 Chapter 4 includes some of these documents.
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Therefore, the potentiality of Ergonomics to understand purposeful
interactions could lead to a better understanding of the wrong actions committed by
the user of technology and to switch from technology centred-design to user-centred
design (Wilson, 2000).
In addition, Ergonomics provides designers with the information about what
are the best ways by which the users will perform better with technology (Wilson,
2000). Ideally, those ergonomic scientists should need to work closely to the
designers and users, providing intermediation between the needs of the users and the
limitations of the designers. Normally, designers and users think in a different way
about technology (Lutzhoft, 2004; Kristiansen, 2005; Reason, 1990).
Designers use a causal model based on what is the reaction of the system after
applying certain variable or input. Users, on the other hand, use the perspective of
how a certain variable can be applied to the system in order to achieve the desired
result (Lutzhoft, 2004). The users are more interested on the intended result from
using technology; designers pursue a permanent search to further improve the design
of technology.
Furthermore, designers and developers of technology tend not to consider the
user in early stages of design. For example, in order to apply the safety regulations,
designers put some barriers that could reduce the visibility or the accessibility to the
system by the users. Then, when the system is in normal operation, the users can find
the system's safety-barriers to be not understandable, and consequently eliminating
or disabling them, or even they can start performing procedures which are away from
those procedures designed by the designers (Bernard & Hassan, 2002).
In this regard, Lutzhoft (2004) and Rowley (2006) say that there is proof
showing what designers and developers put on the display devices, for example, not
necessarily what the mariners want to see.
In addition, many system designers perceive operators (users) of the system
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as unreliable and inefficient, and then they intend and foster the substitution of the
user by incorporating automated devices in the task to make it safer (Reason, 1990).
However, the outcome of this technology incorporation does not result always in the
desired level of safety, particularly when technology is designed and incorporated
without considering the user and without giving him or her the corresponding
training (Lutzhoft, 2004; Rowley, 2006; Dekker, 2006).
As an illustration, there is a case where a company decided to incorporate an
Electronic Chart System after one of its ship grounded. Soon after, the company had
another ship grounding with heavy damage on the hull where the Electronic Chart
System was installed but not used as it should be. The report of this accident did not
include as direct cause of the accident the lack of proper use of the Electronic Chart
System. However, the report specifically mentions that the Master was not using it
and he had never received training on its operation (Marine Accident Investigation
Branch[MAIB], 2007).
Another important advantage of using Ergonomics as often is possible, is that
it has a consequence in the way the organisational culture perceives Human Error.
Wilson (2000) states that the blame culture is against a sound application of
ergonomics. The reasoning behind it is that blaming the humans without asking why
he or she made this error, there will be no progress. Only by eliminating the blew
fuse, the situation that led to the error, will be brought back (Wilson, 2000).
One example is the oil spill incident from the Tanker Vessel Randgrid in
2000. The Randgrid was unloading crude oil at Tetney terminal monobuoy, in the
United Kingdom (UK). It was moored as usual by the bow. A hawser was fixed
through a chafing chain stuck by the chain stopper. During the night there was an
unintentional operation of the chain stopper from the bridge which provoked the
loosing of the mooring manoeuvre and consequent disconnection of the hoses. The
outcome of the incident was an oil spill of 12 tonnes of crude oil (MAIB, 2002).
The aperture of the chain stopper was controlled from a multifunctional
20

console on the bridge by pressing the F9 button. Presumably, with the chain stopper
control displayed, someone tried to shut down the hydraulic pumps for which,
coincidently, F9 had to be pressed. The Company conducted an investigation and
found that the cause was Human Error. The error was that someone pushed a button
on a keyboard selecting the wrong display (MAIB, 2002).
Had the company introduced the application of Ergonomics, possibly in the
first place the chain stopper and hydraulic pumps would not be operated from the
same console. Also, the cause of the accident could have been completely different,
which probably aimed to improve the design of the HMI in this case.

2.3.- The OOW perception of technology
It has already mentioned, the importance of the user's characteristics and
expectations for the HMI. The expectations that users have about technology are
influenced by the way they perceive it (Rowley et al, 2006). This section describes
how the user's perception of technology was 25 years ago and how it is today.
When the trend of introducing technology increased notoriously in the 1980s
there were many uncertainties which raised even more questions and many
researches tried to forecast what would happen. The problem of having only one man
performing watch on the bridge or the existence of dual purpose officers, put serious
challenges for Education and Training and for regulatory framework. At that time,
the opinion of seafarers about technology was “Too many but not needed; Not
reliable enough; Poor operational manual; Configuration of the bridge not
comprehensive enough (Muirhead, 1992, p. 7).
Again, in the research of Lutzhoft (2004), her findings showed that seafarers,
not totally refusing, are not very keen in using the technology and they are least keen
when they are under pressure. According to her findings, seafarers prefer to keep the
method they know already4 (Lutzhoft, 2004).
4 One example of this is given in Section 5.2. Particularly the reaction of the Second Officer when
he did not understand the evolution of his vessel.
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In 2007, in an article that appeared in Alert, one master wrote about
automation and Standard of Training, Certification and Watch keeping 1978
Convention as amended in 1995 (STCW), and linked the both with the need for
having an electronic officer in the Safe Manning Certificate. He said that one of the
goals of automation is to reduce costs and he identified that one of the main problems
with automation is that it becomes unreliable when a failure or unexpected result
arises. This failure causes the crew to become overloaded because they have to
switch the system to manual and wait for shore personnel to fix it. At the end, he
added that, if no solution is found to this problem, "automation just for the sake of
saving costs is an accident waiting to happen..."(Jiménez, p. 3, 2007).
The perception narrated above about automation is clear. “Automation is
great when it works”, according to Lutzhoft (2004, p. 1). Users of technology tend to
lose trust on technology when failures appear (Bainbridge, 1983), and consequently
tend to by pass the technology introducing themselves in the task.
In addition, there are findings of scary perceptions of the integrated systems
by seafarers. This perception leads the users not to use efficiently the tool that they
are supposed to operate. This behaviour is even more dangerous than taking the way
of using the equipment with the possibility of making a mistake (Rowley et al, 2006).
Furthermore, bridges designed to be operated with an automated system are
not so handy to be operated manually. Particular skills and dedicated personnel are
required, who are no more available as they used to be. Training the users in
equipment functionalities, limitations and capabilities is the only way for seafarers to
become familiar with and attain the necessary trust in the equipment (Rowley et al,
2006).
Nevertheless, there are samples where seafarers are appointed on-board
without knowing how to operate the equipment (IMO, 2003b).
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2.4.- Role of the OOW when interacting with technology
This section will show how the interaction users and technology takes place
from the side of the users and what the factors are that contribute to the HMI. Users
who interact with technology, generally play three roles: monitor, collector of
information and actuator (Lutzhoft, 2004).
Starting with the monitoring role, the OOW has to monitor that the
technology is performing according to his intentions, e.g. following the planned
route, adjusting speed to arrive on the expected time, and so on. The OOW is not
directly involved in the navigation any more. When something goes wrong the OOW
will take notice after the system indicates it; therefore, the OOW all of a sudden will
have to adjust himself or herself from normal operations to abnormal operations and
try to manage the situation.
Unfortunately, studies have shown that humans beings are poor monitors of
the automated systems. Humans tend to rely more on the warnings and emergency
alerts than on their own checking processes putting much trust on the systems.
Lutzhoft & Dekker (2002) made these assertions studying the outcome of the
accident of the Passenger Vessel Royal Majesty, in June 1995.
Very briefly, none member of the BTM realized that the Global Positioning
System (GPS) receiver had changed to Dead Reckoning Mode. This device was
providing position to the INS which was in automation mode, and did not recognize
any hazard in the change of mode of the GPS. The vessel went off track 17 miles and
grounded. Nobody was alerted of what was happening until too late, nothing could
stop the grounding (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 1997).
Also, users tend to consider a system that has been working without failure,
to be less prone to fail. When nothing wrong is happening, the task of monitoring the
system is almost meaningless, which makes the monitor not to be very attentive to it
(Lutzhoft & Dekker, 2002).

23

On the contrary, when something wrong occurs unexpectedly, a high level of
attention is needed to understand what is happening, acknowledge the malfunction
and react accordingly. This drawback in the monitoring role of the user was
acknowledged recently by IMO by the following statement where it is analysed the
use of HRA in the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) and is specifically pointed out
that technology can create “long periods of low workload when a high degree of
automation is used. This in turn can lead to an inability to respond correctly when
required“ (IMO, 2007c, p. 26).5
Other industries can allocate the task of only monitoring, indicating that if
something goes wrong, another person more qualified has to be called for to take
care of the malfunction (Bainbridge, 1983); unfortunately, this possibility is not
available on a ship. The OOW can call the Master when the former does not
understand the situation; however, nothing assures that the Master could have more
skills than the OOW to manage a failure in technology.
Another aspect to consider in the monitoring role is the fact that technology
today does not show the user what is happening inside it. This reduces the user's
comprehension of its role as monitor of the system and raises uncertainty of what to
monitor. Technology has put at least two layers among the intended result and the
user. Starting from the user, the first layer is the HMI and the second layer is the
“Task Interactive System”6 (TIS) (Reason, 1990, p. 174). The latter is the part of the
system at the lowest level which directly controls the execution of the task (Reason,
1990).
For example, the OOW has to control the course of a vessel. At present, the
vessel will have an autopilot system which will receive the intended heading
information from the OOW as an input. The input is done through the HMI. The
autopilot will send the signal to the so called TIS, which at the end will control the
rudder position in order to put the heading of the vessel on the ordered course. After
5 Further reference to the Human Reliability Analysis is made in Section 3.3
6 Section 4.2, ISO 17894 refers to the Task Interactive System as Equipment Under Control.
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the TIS has performed the task, it will send a signal back to the HMI which will
present it in a display, informing the user that the order is being executed. In the
meantime, the user has no idea how the rudder is controlled.
Another contribution to the problem of monitoring technology by OOW is
given by Barnett (2007). He confirmed the weak monitor capacity of the seafarer and
highlighted the occurrence of inadvertent erroneous actions that can cause an
accident delayed in time. These actions are called latent errors and bring about new
sources of accidents (Barnett, 2007).
The second role is acting as a collector of information. Lutzhoft & Dekker
(2002) have determined that when collecting information, the user has to integrate
the information given by the system with the normal practice, rules and regulations
to give it sense in order to accomplish the task.
This role is affected by the fact that the information is coming from different
types of equipment made by different manufacturers, which signifies different HMI
designs. Special care in this role regards the mode awareness. This mode will
determine which information will be displayed. Unfortunately, studies have shown
that users tend to assume that the information given by the system is accurate without
any kind of verification, which at the end lead to bias the decision of the users
(Lutzhoft & Dekker, 2002).
The third role mentioned is the actuator, on which the user having monitored
the system, collected and integrated the information provided, is able to make a
decision and take the necessary action. Normally, this action is performed using the
same system, which will be updated with the outcome of the new action and will be
displaying feedback information (Lutzhoft, 2004).
The three roles described above are performed permanently and without
specific order. The user is a monitor and also a collector of information, or could be
introducing an action while monitoring the system, and so on. The level of
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performance of the user in whatever role will be strongly influenced by the
knowledge they have about the equipment (Dekker, 2006).
In this regard, studies found that users often have some buggy knowledge of
the equipment (Dekker, 2006). They know how to operate it but they do not know its
limitations and capabilities. In the case of seafarer, it was found that they are not
familiar with the emergency procedures after a failure on the equipment. According
to an United States NTSB' study cited by Rowley et al (2006), in which 100
accidents were analysed, 35% of the casualties were found with a contributory cause
the “inadequate knowledge about the equipment”(p. 19).
Coupled with the necessary knowledge about the equipment, Dekker (2006)
established that that knowledge should be organized in the user's mind and the user
should be able to call for it according to the context of the situation. Otherwise, the
user could have acquired the knowledge but not be able to use it. Therefore, Dekker
(2006) claims that it is requisite that the users learn about the equipment and practice
with it in order to internalise the knowledge.
However, with some automated systems the aspect of organizing and
internalising the knowledge is difficult, because automation had reduced the chances
for seafarers to have hands-on experience (NRC, 1994). “Computers can increase
system reliability to a point where mechanical failures are rare”(Decker, 2006,
p.151), leaving not many opportunities to the users to keep the skills high to manage
system malfunctions.
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- Chapter 3 - The Human Factor
“People remain a basic component with all their strengths and weaknesses which can both cause a
disaster or prevent it” (O¨Neil, 2001a, p. 1)

The term the Human Factor is used with different meanings and this Chapter
will mention different definitions of the Human Factor. Special mention will be
placed to the aspect of Human Error.

3.1.- Conceptualization of the Human Factor
There is an indication that 80% of accidents have Human Factor in its
causality chain (Hetherington et al, 2006). According to the literature reviewed, it
was found that the term Human Factor is being used to refer either to the people
inside the organisation or the factors that influence behaviour or to a field of study.
Starting with the Human Factor as people inside the organisation, Mr William
O´Neil (2001) declared that the seafarer is the “the human factor that operates at the
cutting edge of the sea transportation”(p.1). He refers to it as the core of the industry,
who has the final control and the responsibility of the safe and efficient waterborne
transportation.
The German delegation to the IMO/NAV subcommittee, submitted recently a
document with the following definition of the Human Factor: “workload, capabilities
and limits of a user trained according to the regulations of the organisation 7”(IMO,
2007a, p. 37). Moreover, IMO has another term when addressing the people in the
organisation, and that term is the Human Element. Human Element is defined as a
“complex, multidimensional issue that affect maritime safety”(IMO, 2003c, p. 3) and
needs particular attention in order to understand it.
7 In the cited document, the term Organisation is referring to the IMO.
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In 2005, the United States delegation to the MEPC submitted a document
acknowledging that the concept of the Human Element has to follow the current
situation of "technology, safety culture and vessel operations"(IMO, 2005b, p. 1) and
a systematic approach was needed. A check list to organize the work on Human
Element aspects is provided, which was adopted from check list that the
petrochemical industry uses to manage changes of any aspect in its organisation8
(IMO, 2005b).
Nevertheless, Graveson (2005) indicates that both terms, Human Factor and
Human Element, are used in shipping indistinctly to refer to seafarers matters, but
often these terms are not “properly addressed”(p. 1).
Following, referring to Human Factor as the factors that influence behaviour,
the European Commission (2001) in a research and development study, highlighted
that in any means of transport the presence of human beings and their relation with
the machine is essential. For that, they consider all aspects of the Human Factor that
have an outcome on the behaviour of individuals, which consequently have an
impact on the safety and efficiency of transportation.
Thomson (2008), points out that there is no standard criteria in what is
included inside the Human Factor that affect human behaviour. He sustains that it is
common to confuse in the causes of an accident the Human Factor with a “symptom
or outcome”(p. 2) of a certain Human Factor. He considers that, so far, there is
agreement in the following human factors:


fatigue;



alcohol and drugs;



crew qualifications and training;



workplace;



sensory overload;

8 See Appendix A
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fitness including mental factors;



crew communication difficulties;



law of conservation of energy including procedures and operating
manuals; and



deliberate or wilful behaviour.

Thomson (2008) specifically excludes from Human Factor the situational awareness,
which he says is an outcome or symptom.
In third place, assuming Human Factor as a field of study, Squire (2005)
defines Human Factor as the “body of scientific knowledge relating about people and
how they interact with their environment, especially when working” (Squire, 2005, p.
5). Sea Systems (2006) add more participation of the so called soft sciences in the
concept of Human Factor: “an engineering discipline that applies theory, methods
and research findings from Ergonomics, Psychology, Physiology, Anatomy and other
disciplines to the design of manned systems” (Sea Systems, 2006, p. 1-12).
Similar to the previous definition, Earthy and Sherwood (2007) identified that
the Human Factor pertains to the human science and is affected by three aspects:


Human engineering - looking forward for the optimization of the human and
machine performance;



Safety – identifying and assessing hazards to health in the operation of the
ship; and



Health and Safety – identifying the risk when the ship is working in normal
or abnormal situations.
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3.2.- Human error and Technology
Normally a wrong operation of technology on the bridge is attributed to
Human Error. This usually leads to the incorporation of further technology, even
more complex (Lutzhoft, 2004).
At first, Kristiansen (2005) citing statistics, places that participation of
Human Error in accidents is between 75% to 90% (p. 314) of the cases, which is
similar to the information from Hetherington et al (2006) referring to the Human
Factor. He found, that the term Human Error is not a straightforward concept, so he
questions the accuracy of the statistics.
Furthermore, Kristiansen (2005) says that the term Human Error involves a
generalization where many things can fit in to it, which could be leaving no side to
determine other potential reasons for the wrong action committed. He characterizes
Human Error as a vague concept and the perception of it is highly influenced by the
background of those investigators appointed to analyse the Human Error. Also,

he

argues that this generalization of the Human Error as a term on which failures can be
justified, it is also used by the designers of technology as a way to “get clear of
responsibility for problems not considered as technical”(p. 42).
In addition, Fujita & Hollnagel (2004) shares with Kristiansen (2005) the
opinion that Human Error is not a clear concept. They back the idea that when an
accident occurs, it is because there are surrounding error-prone situations or activities
which lead to the particular error of a person or group of persons. Furthermore, they
consider that attributing everything to Human Error is “fundamentally a social and
psychological process and not an objective, technical one”(Woods et al, 1994 as cited
by Fujita & Hollnagel, 2004).
Moreover, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research-NUREG- (2007) has launched recently the User's
Guide of its HRA technique9. In this publication there is no definition or assumption
9 It refers to the HRA technique ATHEANA which is briefly described in Section 3.4
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of the term Human Error. It is only stated that the “term Human Error is only used in
a very general way, with the terms human failure event and unsafe action being used
to describe more specific aspects of human errors”(United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commision Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research [NUREG], 2007, p. xvi).
Regarding how the background of Human Error investigators influence the
result of the investigation, Dekker (2006) cited a research with the purpose of
identifying errors in a normal watch of a traffic control tower. The researchers used
two groups of investigators to spend time observing normal watches of an air traffic
control tower. One group was composed of traffic controllers and the second group
was composed of experts on psychology and psychiatry. Both of them identified
Human Errors in the performance, but the errors identified were dissimilar between
both groups (Dekker, 2006).
Incidentally, there is the common assumption that whenever a failure
happens, Human Error should be involved. Dekker (2006) and Reason (1999) sustain
that there is not such easy determination. The system when it is working it needs the
interaction with the human, who is connecting the technology outcomes with the
environment. The assumption mentioned is backed with another assumption that the
electronic systems are more accurate than humans, that they are “safe and wellfunctioning systems”(Dekker, 2006, p. 76).
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Figure 2: Human performance levels (Kristiansen, 2005)

Conversely, the problem with the two previous assumptions is that systems
are designed to be operated by humans, at least in the case of the shipping industry so
far. Therefore, it is the combination user and technology that creates a further system
in which both limit or enhance each other's performance. In this reasoning, how the
HMI is designed plays a particular and important role.
Further, Rasmussen (1982) cited by Reason (1990), provided a classification
on the types of errors. This classification of errors is called the Generic Error
Modelling System (GEMS), and is based on categorization of three different human
performance levels:
1. Skill based. In this category slips and lapses of the skill based performance
are located. The error normally is originated by a departure from a wellestablished routine (Reason, 1990). Performance in this level is the result of
“highly trained tasks” (Kristiansen, 2005, p. 395) that are carried out
unconsciously by the user.
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2. Rule based. This category is related to the procedures to follow, facing certain
situations. The user needs to be trained in this procedures.
3. Knowledge based. This category is when the user has to solve an unexpected
problem. The user has to integrate his or her system's knowledge, consider
the context and solve the problem. In this category, the users have good
experience using the technology, however, they can behave as novices when
facing a new situation (Reason, 1990).
(Kristiansen, 2005)
Also, Kristiansen (2005) related this three performance levels with the size of
damage and frequency of occurrence. This is shown in Figure 2. It can be appreciated
that the skill based errors are the most frequent but purport less damage when
comparing them with errors committed in the other two types.
The Figure 2 is useful to see that knowledge of procedures and principles of
technology can be crucial for problem-solving, because they are the foundations on
which the user will base the decision process.
Regarding the most common errors that a user commit in his or her
interaction with technology, Dekker (2006) identified those contained in Table 1.
Roles
Monitor

Errors related
Lack of mode awareness
Lack of awareness of any changes in the
system
Collector of in- Overload of / get lost in information
formation
Increase workload processing information
Actuator
Not coordination off computing entries
Table 1: Roles of the user of technology and common
errors (adapted from Dekker, 2006)
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In addition, there are some particularities that technology has brought with,
which in a certain level foster the occurrence of the mentioned errors:
1. Technology can make things invisible, or not appreciable by human beings.
The presentation or interfaces can be fashionable but they can hide a lot
complexity of information. The user can be aware of the status of the
system, but not about the behaviour inside.10
2. The operators may switch to manage the computer interface instead of
managing the situation. This is the same that Lutzhoft (2004) warned about
when the tool becomes an end in itself, therefore it becomes inefficient.
3. The possible change of mode without alerting the operator.
4. Computers are not aware of the surrounding situation. The integrated system
will perform the task according to the input parameters. However, if any
changes occur in the environment, the integrated will not notice them by
itself; the integrated system will need to be updated with the new
parameters, otherwise they will not react accordingly to the new situation.
(Dekker, 2006).

3.3.- Management of Human Error in Shipping – FSA+HRA
Contrary to what was mentioned in Section 3.2, IMO has a definition of
Human Error and accordingly has a procedure to assess the impact of Human Error
in the industry. IMO defines Human Error as “a departure from acceptable or
desirable practice on the part an individual or a group of individuals that can result in
unacceptable or undesirable results”(IMO, 2007c, p. 21).
The definition does not show any consideration of context or situation; it was
included here not only to show the difference of criteria that IMO has with other
practitioners of Human Error studies, but also, to point out that this perception of
10 An example of this particularity was given in Section 2.4 p. 19
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Human Error could be against the need to go into the HMI concept in depth.
The definition locates the individual at the centre of the potential
unacceptable or undesirable practice and does not considers the possibility of having
a technology centred designed, with which humans could not operate safely and
efficiently.
IMO has included the analysis of Human Error in its methodology of risk
assessment, called FSA and has been in used in IMO since 1997; recently, it was
updated and condensed in one document (IMO, 2007c). Its purpose is to be used as
the basic methodology when incorporating or updating regulations; currently, it is
perceived as the normal methodology at the time of analysing different risk scenarios
needed to be dealt with regulations.(Kristiansen, 2005).
The FSA involves 5 steps in a close-loop which are shown in Figure 3. The
principle is that once the regulation has been created, its outcome needs to be verified
taking the methodology again to Step 1. The five steps are:
1.- Hazard Identification (HAZID).
2.- Risk Analysis.
3.- Risk Control Options (RCOs).
4.- Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA).
5.- Recommendations for decision-making.”
(IMO, 2007c, p. 5)
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In this respect, hazardous industries have recognised that to improve the
accuracy in any risk assessment, it is necessary to approach the human participation

FSA steps that
contains HRA
steps

Figure 3: FSA Flow chart with indication of HRA steps (adapted from Kristiansen,
2005, p. 284)
to failures. Therefore, a methodology originated in the nuclear industry is utilized
and is identified under the name HRA (Kristiansen, 2005).
This HRA methodology had to be adapted to the reality of the particular
industry. For example, de nuclear industry does not incorporate human participation
at early stages of the risk assessment due to its high level of automation where the
participation of the human being is almost null (IMO, 2007c).
On the contrary, the maritime industry and the vessels in particular, the
intervention of the Human Element in the system is more frequent and immediate. It
can be appreciated in Figure 3 that the HRA plays a role on three of the five steps of
the IMO FSA. This is due to the recognised “high-level task analysis” (IMO, 2007c,
p. 20) needed in this particular industry.
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Generally speaking the HRA is divided in five steps as follows:
1. Identification of key tasks.
2. Task analysis of key tasks.
3. Human error identification.
4. Human error analysis.
5. Human reliability quantification.
(IMO, 2007c, p. 20)
IMO states clearly that the HRA should not be overstressed and always has to
be done in the same level of soundness as the corresponding FSA. Due to the limited
data on the maritime field regarding Human Error, its determination depends much
on expert opinions, however to carry on quantitative analysis HRA techniques are
also considered.
Incidentally, there is a variety of techniques that can be applied to the HRA
whose use will depend upon the availability of data, results expected, deepness of the
analysis, and so on.(IMO, 2007c)
IMO normally uses two techniques:


Technique of Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP);



Human Error Assessment Reduction Technique (HEART).

(Kristiansen, 2005)
Both techniques are characterized by using a series of predetermined factors
that contain quantified aspects affecting user's performance. THERP call its factors
Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) and HEART call its factors Error Producing
Conditions (EPC). They differ from each other, but the principle is the same: the
consideration of predetermined factors that independently affects the performance of
the user.
IMO considers THERP as the “best known and most”(Kristiansen, 2005, p.
332; IMO, 2007c, p. 34) used technique in analysing and quantifying Human Error
probabilities. At the same time, it is recognised that is highly dependant on its
Human Errors database, which is from the Nuclear industry. However, THERP can
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result in a high effort of analysis which can be more intensive than the effort required
for the corresponding FSA. Nevertheless, its use is highly recommended due to be
considered a good technique to analyse the RCOs and to evaluate systematically the
role of Human Error.(IMO, 2007c)
For the case of HEART, IMO considers it simpler than THERP and with less
necessity of having pre-saved data regarding Human Error. Also, IMO underlines the
fact that HEART takes into consideration aspects of environment surrounding the
tasks and Ergonomics (IMO, 2007c).
Kirwan (1997) has found that HEART does not perform well when assessing
certain types of errors, such as undesired actions, simple slips, tasks needing
decomposition and interdependent tasks. In addition, he identified that a certain level
of inconsistency is allocated in how the General Error Probability is determined,
which is a value allocated by the assessor to determine the probability of occurrence
of certain error. Regarding the selection of EPCs, he also found certain inconsistency
in this technique, mainly because the selection of EPC was related to the background
or experience of the assessor.
HEART provides a fixed list of five contributions to reduce error when the
FSA is in the stage of providing measures to minimize the identified risk,:
1. “Impaired system knowledge.
2. Response time shortage.
3. Poor or ambiguous system feedback
4. Significant judgement required of operator.
5. Level of alertness resulting from duties, ill health or the environment."
(IMO, 2007c, p. 25)
Regarding the Human Machine Interface, three of the contributions listed
above are closely related to it, namely numbers 1, 3 and 4. The difficulty is how
these five contributions are implemented after being accepted. For instance, are they
applied on the seafarer improving his or her training and education to fight against
the impaired system knowledge? Or, are they applied on designing a new system or
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improving the current one?
Kristiansen (2005) citing information from the IMO website, said that
according to IMO, the maritime community is spending “80% of the available
resources” (p. 295) to technical aspects, dedicating the “20%” (p. 295) rest to the
Human Element. This distribution is not logical when looking at the data pointing
out that 80% of the accidents are due to Human Error.
Regarding these two techniques which are considered to pertain to the first
generation of HRA techniques, Kristiansen (2005) has indicated that there have been
criticized by those who sustain the difficulty of determining Human Error based
mainly in predetermined factors. Those criticisms comes particularly from
ergonomics practitioners which perceive the impossibility of determine Human Error
without a thorough consideration of context and situation (Kirwan, 1996).
Kristiansen (2005) provides a list of shortcomings found in this first
generation techniques which is shown below:
● Questionable data used by these techniques to reflect real situations when
assessing or predicting error probabilities.
● Lack of consistency regarding errors of commission.
● Inexistent proofs of accuracy of these techniques regarding their predictions.
● Arguable assumptions about human behaviour.
● Not enough treatment of PSF, particularly how this factors affect behaviour
and performance.
● Static consideration of the situations.
● Mechanical decomposition of human actions.
● Uncertainty of the quantitative results.
● Not good to explain the cause of Human Errors.
● Lack of systematic task analysis.
● Lack of strategies to reduction of errors.
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3.4.- Human error from other perspectives – CREAM &
ATHEANA
Two other approaches to assess Human Error will be mentioned in this
section that purport different foundations from THERP and HEART. They are
identified as part of the second generation of HRA techniques and are the result from
lessons learned from the formers techniques (Kristiansen, 2005).
To begin, Fujita & Hollnagel (2004) sustain that the use of PSF or EPC to
establish the performance of the human being is not appropriate. On the contrary,
they consider that it is necessary on every occasion to analyse the context which is
what will be predominant to determine the Human Error.11
In this sense, Fujita & Hollnagel (2004) support this so called the second
generation of HRA techniques, specially:


Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM).



A Technique for Human Element Analysis (ATHEANA)
Starting with CREAM, this methodology introduces what is called the 10

Common Performance Conditions (CPCs) which determine the context. The CPCs
has to be considered interdependent and can increase or reduce the probability of
error. They have to be applied regarding the level of control that the user has over the
situation. Both, CPCs first and levels of controls later, will be listed below. The CPCs
are:
1. adequacy of organisation,
2. working conditions,
3. adequacy of MMI and operational support,
4. availability of procedures/plans,
11 Section 4.2 regarding ISO 17894 shows that the same principle is sustained by ISO. ISO calls
context as “context of use” and establishes what aspects of this context of use should be
considered.
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5. number of simultaneous goals,
6. available time,
7. time of day (circadian rhythm),
8. adequacy of training and experience,
9. crew collaboration quality,
10. communication efficiency”.
(Fujita & Hollnagel, 2004, p. 146).
CREAM considers that in any situation, four could be the level of control, or
modes, that the user can have over the situation, and these modes can perfectly fit in
any analysis of accident situation, for example, in the maritime industry:
1. SCRAMBLED. In this mode the user has no possible control, no planning or
preparation. Decision are totally by chance and actions normally are not
related to the situation.
2. OPPORTUNISTIC. In this mode decisions are not sufficient. Success is not
totally achieved. It happens when lack of competence or external factors
among others, limit the possibility of a thorough planning process.
3. TACTIC. In this mode, actions respond to current situations. Planning has
been done, however not completed. No foreseen situations are considered.
4. STRATEGIC. Thorough analysis and planning. Actions concurrent with
planning and situations.
(Fujita & Hollnagel, 2004)
Following with ATHEANA, which is a technique applied on the nuclear
industry and has as basic premise that it is necessary to contextualize potential
situations in order to predict failures. It sustains that the PSFs in combination with
the plant conditions (nuclear plant conditions) can lead to an error forcing situation,
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where the user can not review a miss diagnosis even when receiving contradictory
information. (Powers, 1999)
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- Chapter 4 - Regulatory status of the HMI regarding
technology on the bridge
Safety Of Life At Sea 74 Convention and STCW 78 Convention amended in
1995, are the two IMO Conventions which deal with the incorporation of technology
and training on the bridge. Currently, ISO has implemented mandatory standards to
regulate the incorporation of technology on the bridge and its design.
Furthermore, there is a pile of IMO non-mandatory documents which are
intended to be recommendations and guidelines in the aspect of dealing with new
technology. Often, they are the predecessor of future mandatory regulations and
indicate how the maritime community attention is shifting towards the issues.

4.1.- IMO Mandatory Regulations
First, the SOLAS 1974 Convention deals with bridge design and
incorporation of technology in Chapter V. According to its Regulation 15, all the
concerning matters relating to the incorporation of technology on the bridge should
be oriented under the following fundamentals principles:
1. to ease the task;
2. to improve bridge resource management;
3. to ease the access to the necessary information;
4. “to indicate the operational status of automated components” (IMO, 2004a, p.
366);
5. to permit an efficient decision making process by the bridge team;
6. to facilitate the work on the bridge, preventing fatigue or interference with the
task;
7. “to minimize and detect human error on the bridge”. (IMO, 2004a, p.
366-367).
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Above all, the principles indicate that technology should help the task of the
OOW. However, there is no consideration to the HMI in this incorporation. All the
principles are centred in what the technology should be capable of performing.
In addition, SOLAS 74 Convention contains in its Chapter 9 the Management
for Safe Operations of the ships, which introduces the International Safety
Management (ISM) Code to improve the Management of Safety at sea. ISM Code
expresses in “broad terms” (IMO, 2002, p.5) procedures to enhance safety which are
particularly allocated on the Company.
The Company has to set measures versus known risks and to develop a
program to improve the skills of the personnel relating to safety operation. It also has
to establish procedures for emergency preparedness, for training of new comers and
maintenance of equipment to avoid “hazardous situations”(IMO, 2002, p. 11). There
is no detail regarding consideration of HMI.
Second, the STCW 78 Convention as amended deals with the aspect of
training certification and watch keeping of seafarer. It specifically remarks that the
provisions are to be applied only to the training requirements described in the STCW
78 Convention as amended, consequently all other types of training are not bound by
this Convention (IMO, 2001).
Moreover, as well as in the ISM Code, the STCW 78 Convention as amended
dedicates particular attention to the training of new comers allocating this
responsibility on the company. One particular requirement is to assure that seafarers
are familiarized with “all ship arrangements, installations, equipment, procedures and
ship characteristics that are relevant to their routine or emergency duties” (IMO,
2001, p. 33 Convention).
Likewise, regarding the general requirements to perform watch, the STCW
Convention as amended requires “the familiarity of (the) officer with the ship's
equipment, procedures and manoeuvring capability” (IMO, 2001, p. 152 Code) and
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the “operational status of bridge instrumentation and controls, including alarm
systems” (IMO, 2001, p. 153 Code).
In addition, Section A-I/14 of the Code provides that the Company shall
ensure by means of written procedures that fresh personnel has the chance to have a
“reasonable opportunity to become familiar” (IMO, 2001, p. 24 STCW Code) with
the equipment they are required to operate. However, there is no specification to
what is the level of familiarization expected in the Convention to consider it
satisfactory .
Finally, the STCW 78 as amended, addresses the minimum requirements that
the deck personnel should comply with, which are further detailed in the Code to this
Convention. Above all, there is no requirement regarding the knowledge about the
specific equipment installed on board the specific vessel where the seafarer will
operate, but familiarization.

4.2.- ISO 17894 – “Ships and marine technology —
Computer applications — General principles for the
development and use of programmable electronic systems in
marine applications”
This document set down mandatory standards principles for marine electronic
systems. It is a binding regulation that applies particularly to the producers of
technology. This document refers to the marine electronic system as Programmable
Electronic Systems (PES): “any shipboard system based on one or more sets of
Programmable Electronic (PE) devices that are connected to input devices and output
devices for the purposes of implementing control, safety or monitoring”(International
Standard Organisation [ISO], 2005, p. 13).
The PES always has to interact in three levels; the first is with the user, the
second is with the Equipment Under Control (EUC) and the third is with those
external devices not belonging to the PES, but in a way provide or receive
information to/from it (ISO, 2005).
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The document mentions that any PES should follow the system engineering
philosophy, by which the requirements of the system are collected from the users and
other related operators with the goal of providing “operational capability” (ISO,
2005, p. 17), having in mind the complete life cycle of the PES. It is recognised that
there will always be trade-off to manage between “competing factors of performance,
risk and cost” (ISO, 2005, p. 17).
Furthermore, it addresses the fact that PES effectiveness will depend upon a
thorough analysis of the “context of use” (ISO, 2005, p.2). Important aspects of the
context of use are the user' characteristics, tasks expected to be performed, the
software and hardware of the PES, the systems that interact with the PES, the
environment on which the PES is expected to perform.
However, the consideration of the context of use turns out to be particularly
difficult when acquiring Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) equipment. In this latter
case, it is recommended to conduct a generic mode approach (ISO, 2005).
The context of use is required to be considered whenever a risk assessment on
the incorporation of PES is carried out. In addition to the context of use, the impact
on safety and performance of the ship that the PES will have has to be considered.
The context of use and the impact on safety will be the two elements that will
determine the soundness of the risk assessment (ISO, 2005).
This document provides a set of 20 principles under which any PES for
marine purposes has to be designed and operated. Below are quoted seven of those
principles that were identified as having close relation with the aspect of interface
between the human beings and machines:
1. "The PES shall provide functions which meet user's needs" (p.7).
2. "Functions shall be appropriately allocated between users and PES" (p.7).
3. "The PES shall be tolerant of faults and input errors" (p. 23).
4. “The PES shall be acceptable to the user and support effective and efficient
operation under specified conditions" (p. 26).
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5. "The operation of the PES shall be consistent and shall correspond to user
expectations of the underlying process" (p. 27).
6. "The interaction between the PES and the user shall be controllable by the
user" (p. 28).
7. "Human-centred activities shall be employed throughout the life cycle" (p.
32).
Finally, this document stresses the use of the context of use as a basis in the
design and development of PES. This context of use will be used with the
characteristics of the future user and considering the task to be performed. This
approach is more in line with what the second generation of HRA analysis techniques
is saying, than with the THERP and HEART techniques.

4.3.- IMO non-mandatory regulations
The documents chosen here have as main subject INS and IBS. The purpose
of checking this documentation is to see chronologically how the perception of the
HMI interface has evolved since 1996 to 2007.


1996.- Resolution MSC.64(67) “Recommendations on performance standards
for IBS”. This Resolution define IBS as: “a combination of systems which are
interconnected in order to allow centralized access to sensor information or
command/control from workstations, with the aim of increasing safe and
efficient ship’s management by suitably qualified personnel“ (IMO, 1996, p.
3). The definition purport an implicit knowledge of the system by the
personnel, and an improvement of safety. However, this improvement of
safety will depend upon the proficiency of the operator interacting with the
system.
The document contains one reference to the HMI under the name of
MMI, claiming that the MMI should be “easily understood and in a consistent
style”(IMO, 1996, p. 5), there were no more explanation or detail. Also, it is
mentioned that the IBS should be operable by a seafarer with the
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corresponding certifications. Going further, the Resolution details what
should be the technical capabilities of the system, and little reference is made
to the ergonomics and HMI.


1998.- Resolution MSC.86(70) “Annex 3 - Recommendations on
performance standards for INS. This Resolution defines INS as: “a
combination of systems that are interconnected to increase safe and efficient
navigation by suitably qualified personnel” (IMO, 1998a, p. 9).
Standards, functionalities and limitations of the system are described
and there is space for ergonomics considerations. As specific guidance
regarding the HMI, it says “integrated display and control functions should
adopt a consistent HMI philosophy and implementation”(IMO, 1998a, p. 12),
not giving any explanation about the mentioned philosophy.
The Resolution does not consider the training that the users have to
have to operate efficiently this equipment and to be prepared for failures.



1998 cont.- MSC Circ. 891 – “Guidelines for the on-board use and
application of computers”. These guidelines define Integrated System as: “A
combination of Computer-Based Systems (CBS) which are interconnected in
order

to

allow

centralised

access

to

sensor

information

and/or

command/control” (IMO, 1998b, p. 2).
In addition, it is specified that a CBS should be capable of performing
the needed automated processes, accept the user input and give the pertinent
information to the user. Furthermore, it is explicitly mentioned that a CBS
should be feasible of being operated “without previous knowledge by the
user“(IMO, 1998b, p. 5).
Contrary to the two first Resolutions shown in this section, these
guidelines dedicate special attention to the user interface where it is stated
that they have to follow ergonomic criteria and be user-friendly. As a sample
of that is the need for specific documentation in the form of operational
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guides that should be provided to the users.
Regarding the training, it is said that it has to be made looking forward
to qualify personnel in the operation and maintenance of the “equipment in
normal, abnormal and emergency situations” (IMO, 1998b, p. 9). However, it
is contradictory that the CBS should be capable of being used by a user
without previous knowledge, and later the document states that training is
needed (IMO, 1998b).


2000.- MSC/Circ. 982 “Guidelines for ergonomic design of bridges
equipment and layout”(IMO, 2000, p. 1). Its purpose was to provide support
in the design of new bridges giving ergonomic requirements, and to be
considered for further revision of Chapter V of SOLAS 74 Convention (IMO,
2000, p. 3).
This circular basically deals with the layout of the bridge as well as
distribution of the equipment. In a minor scale it approaches aspects of HMI
as the display of information, the management of alarms, the controls
operation and the

mode awareness. It constitutes actually a reference

document by further IMO documents in respect of ergonomics on the bridge
and better utilization of bridge equipment by the users.
One of the major points recommended to stress on is the consistency
in procedures, displays, actions required by the operators, accessibility to
controls. It is underlined that the system should provide unambiguous
information.
Also, using a coding that should be understandable for the user is
considered. For that, the Guidelines call for the use of “familiar
wording”(IMO, 2000, p. 23). The nature of shipping makes this
familiarization hard, for saying the least, keeping in mind the variety of
different cultures and nationalities that can operate on the bridge during the
bridge lifetime (Squire, 2005).
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Above all, the circular identifies seven workstations and each of them
involves the corresponding functions and tasks. Those functions are:
−

Workstation for navigating and manoeuvring.

−

Workstation for monitoring.

−

Workstation for manual steering, also called Helmsman's workstation.

−

Workstation for docking on the wings.

−

Workstation for planning and documentation.

−

Workstation for safety.

−

Workstation for communication.

(IMO, 2000, p. 3)


2003.- MSC/Circular1061 – “Guidance for the operational use of IBS”. These
guidelines give a definition of mode awareness, situational awareness and
failure analysis, in relation with the operation of the Integrated Bridge
System. The document incorporates the need of adding a section on the
Vessel Operating Manual specifically dedicated for IBS. This section is
supposed to have summarized information of check lists and procedures to be
carried out when alarms are triggered, among other types of information.
Three different types of procedures are superficially described,
identified as normal, abnormal and emergency procedures, which the seafarer
has to be familiar with. Also, it is recommended the special care that has to
be borne in mind when incorporating new technology. Regarding the training
for those operators, the guidelines put on the Company's shoulders the
responsibility of settling the knowledge and skill based training (IMO,
2003a).



2003 cont. - MSC Circ. 1091 – “Issues to be considered when introducing
new technology on board ships”. The document, underlining that the
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introduction rate of computer assisted systems had been in an increasing
trend, identified the need to address aspects of interrelation among users and
technology. Among those aspects, the document highlights the need for
designing computer assisted systems using a user centred philosophy,
identifying the new training needs and adapting them to the education of the
users.
Also, it recognizes the diversification of the technology applied on the
bridges, which complicates more the situation at the time of identifying the
training needs. Furthermore, the document underlines that training on
technology is "not always achievable or possible" (IMO, 2003b, Annex p. 1).
The author considers this statement particularly important because here IMO
is saying that there are cases where seafarers are not familiar with the
equipment they have to operate. There is nothing new in it, apart from the
official recognition, which is later in the document reinforced with the
characterization of the danger to safety that it signifies.
The Document claims for standardization at least for those most
common operations; however, there is no mention to how IMO recommends
to achieve this standardization.
Regarding training of users with technology, the document states that
when dealing with bridges that are been refurbished, or bridges from new
built ships, the crew normally is provided with a good level of familiarization
with the equipment. Later on, that crew has to pass-on the information to the
relieves in a non formalized process called "cascade training"(IMO, 2003b,
Annex p. 2).
The document acknowledges that young generations of seafarers tend
to be more keen and better than older generations in the use Information
Technology (IT). However, the document underlines that this young
generation tend to over rely on the systems.
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Furthermore, the document uses the same terminology as Lutzhoft
and Dekker (2000) giving the same perception about how automation has
impacted the industry creating new paths of error and not eliminating tasks,
but changing them.
Moreover, the document coincides with Bainbridge (1983) about the
human limited capacity in monitoring automation systems, a problem that
gets a more serious character when the automation system has been working
without failures and is already installed when the users takes over.
Finally, the document shows as a fact that what technology has
provided is an increase in information, which needs to be managed by the
same user, and that clog of information constitutes a serious hazard.


2004.- MSC 78/11/3 - “Safety of Navigation. Bridge design, equipment and
arrangements. Submitted by International Association of Classification
Societies (IACS)”. The document provides what IACS call Unified
Interpretation (UI) of SOLAS 74 Convention Chapter V, and the “Standards
for Bridge Design, Equipment Arrangement and Procedures (BDEAP)"(IMO,
2004b, Annex p. 8). The purpose of the BDEAP is to facilitate the safety
operation on the bridge and to be used as a "check list" when designing or
modernizing bridges.
Specially, the document adds four more additional bridge functions to
those mentioned in MSC/Circular 982: “extended communication functions,
monitoring and control of ballasting and cargo operations, monitoring and
control of machinery, monitoring and control of domestic systems”(IMO,
2004b, Annex p. 11); however, this document consider that the functions can
be grouped in a way to reducing the workstations needed, which is not the
same found in the MSC/Circular 982.
Furthermore, the document provides a list of standard equipment, but
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it states clearly that it is "regarded as the responsibility of the owners and
users that procedures, knowledge and training of the bridge personnel are
related to the individual ship's bridge system”(IMO, 2004b, Annex p. 15).
Going further, it states that the mentioned procedures should be specified in
the Company and Ship Manual and in the ISM procedures as well.
Regarding the principles of design of navigational systems, it is
specifically stated that they have to follow the ergonomic and humanmachine interface criteria.
Finally, it was established that the requirements in the document
contained are thought to be mandatory for IACS when acting as Recognized
Organisation on behalf of the Flag State according to ISM Code.


2004 cont.- IMO Subcommittee on Standards of Training and Watch keeping
(STW) 36/3/1 “ Validation of model training courses. Model CourseOperational use of IBS” . The aim of the course is to “provide(s) generic
training in the use of IBS and INS”(IMO, 2005a, p. 8) to Masters and OOWs
for vessels equipped with IBS or INS. The course has declared 7 objectives,
among them is the understanding of HMI by the user when interacting with
IBS. This course proposal suffered amendments (IMO, 2005a). However, the
core of the course was not changed and is listed since 2006 in the Model
Courses available (IMO, 2006).
The document starts acknowledging that the operation of an IBS
“requires a level of knowledge beyond the normally given”(IMO, 2004c, p. 4)
to an OOW. Moreover, the lack of standardization in this kind of equipment is
specifically recognized and a set of recommendations are given to producers
of this technology and to the shipping companies. These recommendations
regards carefully the documentation that has to be given to the users by the
manufacturers to ease the familiarization stage.
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Giving particular attention to the lack of standardization, for the very
first time in IMO Model Courses (IMO, 2004c), this course incorporates the
need to familiarize the user with the particular equipment to be operated, after
receiving this Model Course. This requirement intends to follow the spirit of
the Section 6 of ISM Code (IMO, 2004c).
The course covers particularities such as types of IBS/INS,
definitions, changes in the subsystems associated with IBS/INS, principles of
using IBS/INS, mode awareness, failure analysis, and so on. It is scheduled to
be delivered in 40 hours.
The inconvenience of this model course is the stress put on the use of
Full Mission Simulator, an asset which is not available in all MET
Institutions; therefore, making it difficult to be applicable throughout different
Flag States. Almost half of the course is expected to be delivered using
simulators.


2007.- NAV 53 / Inf. 4 – “Revision of performance standards for INS and IBS
– Report of the correspondence group for INS and IBS - submitted by
Germany”. The document underlines the need to assume INS as “one system”
towards which other subsystems interact with. It gives reasons justifying the
use of INS on board, as follows:
1. INS supports safety of navigation by evaluating and combining data
from several sources, consequently producing information.
2.

INS provides mode and situation awareness;

3. "INS aims to be demonstrably suitable for the user and the given task
in a particular context of use".
4. “The INS aims to ensure that, by taking human factors12 into
12 Attention should be given to how this document define Human Factor. The definition was quoted
in Section 3.1.

54

consideration; the workload is kept within the capacity of the operator
in order to enhance safe and expeditious navigation and to
complement the mariner's capabilities, while at the same time to
compensate for their limitations. “
(IMO, 2007a, Annex 1, p. 1)
The justifications chosen are closely related to the HMI. For example
Number 1 speaks about the quality of the INS of evaluating inputs and
combining them. Still it is not clear how INS can be able to do this without
the participation of the user, who is at the end the one who makes the correct
evaluation. Automated systems are abstracted from the environment and need
the participation of the human to realize a close-loop evaluation with the
input data and the desired outcome (Bainbridge, 1983; Reason, 1990;
Lutzhoft, 2004).
Number 2, claims that INS improves situational awareness. In this
regards, some accidents exist proving that due to over reliance on automation
systems, the users tend to loose capability of situational awareness (Rowley et
al, 2006).
Numbers 3 and 4 describe the importance of considering the user;
however, other researches have shown that so far the design of these systems
have been more technology centred (Rowley et al, 2006).
Furthermore, the document highlights the need for using principles of
HMI in the overall design of the system. It is stressed that the design should
be facilitating its understanding and operation by the user, underlining the
control of erroneous inputs and assuring the quick and accurate interpretation
of the system information output by the user.
Also, it gives special attention to the system documentation. This
includes

manuals containing description of function and failures,

presentation of data, structure of redundancy, integrity monitoring, adjustment
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of parameters and installation with interconnection and power supply
arrangements (IMO, 2007a, Annex 1, p.33).
In addition, the document specifies that a familiarization course for
the specific INS installed on board has to be given to new operators. This
provision is said to be under the spirit of the ISM Code. However, this
familiarization course is required to be as short as possible, stressing the
practical side. Adding that for a qualified user, 30 minutes should be enough
to consider him or her familiar with the system.
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- Chapter 5 - Bridge Team Management and Human
Machine Interface
The technology applied on the bridge has to be used by the OOW acting with
his or her team. The BTM becomes an important concept to define. Cases are found
where the BTM are seriously affected by a lack of comprehension of the technology.

5.1.- Bridge Team Management
The efficiency of the watch on the bridge will depend upon the quality of the
personnel and the technology applied on it (Swift,2004). Besides, the personnel has
to know how to use the technology efficiently and safely. BTM is the term most
commonly used to identify the operational performance of personnel and technology
on the bridge.
IACS has provided, for the new revision of standards for IBS/INS, one long
definition of BTM13 from which some words have been highlighted to ease the
understanding. The key elements of the IACS definition are manning the bridge
according to the particular situation, the equipment fitted on the bridge and the
familiarization of the crew members with such equipment. It is mentioned that those
seafarers should be properly trained.
Consequently, the BTM for IACS is the crew trained and familiarized with
the equipment and the equipment itself. In addition, the members of BTM has to
know how to react in case of failure of such equipment (Swift, 2004).
Incidentally, another concept of BTM is related more exclusively to human
13“Safeguarding that the composition of the bridge team is continuously appropriate in
relation to operational conditions by manning dedicated workstations outfitted, arranged
and located for performance of specific functions and effective and safe bridge team
operations by properly trained and fit individuals; familiar with instruments and
equipment to be used and with their individual duties and responsibility as member of the
current bridge team and with the function(s) to be performed at the individual workstations of
the bridge team” (IMO, 2007b, p.8).
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resources: “BTM refers to the management of the human resources (HR) available to
the navigator -helmsman, lookout, engine room watch, etc.- and how to ensure that
all members contribute to the goal of a safe and efficient voyage”(Bowditch, 2002, p.
364)
It does not mention a word about the equipment used by the OOW. Bowditch
(2002), gives an even higher priority to the OOW on the bridge, considering that
whatever technology fitted on the bridge, he or she has to be capable of using the
technology effectively and safely.
Moreover, three aspects are recognised as having strong participation when it
is tried to improve the human performance, and these are: “professional
development, organisational structure and technology”(NRC, 1994, p. 6).


Professional development is regarded as education and training of the
seafarer, where also the training is included on his or her task and the related
equipment.



organisational structure is considered to be hierarchical distribution, as the
distribution of responsibilities, functions and tasks on the bridge as well.



Technology is regarded as the equipment the users have to operate on the
execution of the task. It involves aspects of design of the equipment and
aspects of interaction with the user.

(NRC, 1994)
These three aspects have to be used in conjunction and updated with each
other. For example, while state-of-the-art technology can provides modern means to
carry out the task on the bridge, it will not be able to do so without the specific
training in relation to its operation by those operators. Also, since technology
changes the execution of the task, the structure of the team organisation has to be
reviewed (NRC, 1994).
Following, there are two accident where a problem of knowledge of the
58

technology by the BTM were verified. These two examples occurred two years ago;
fortunately, the outcomes of both accidents did not involve any loss of life or
pollution; however, they constitute an indication of one very serious hazard.

5.2.- Heeling Accident on M/V Crown Princess (18 July 2006)
The Crown Princess is a passenger vessel of
113,561 gt, with 19 decks, 289 metres in length and
48.5 metres wide. It was finished in March and
christened in June 2006. The Accident Report does
not give exact information of the date of being
appointed for duty. The accident occurred in July of
the same year which means that the crew had not
more than 4 months operating on board this vessel
(NTSB, 2008).
The

vessel

was

considered

to

be Figure 4: Crown Princess
appropriately manned and the crew well rested. The
Crown Princess had just left Port Canaveral in Florida, United States, with 3,285
passengers and 1,260 crew members, for its next destination, New York. On the
bridge remained the Captain, Staff Captain, Second Officer, two Fourth Officers and
two helmsmen. The Crown Princess was equipped with a NACOS 65-5 automated
INS, which was considered the latest version made by Sam Electronics at the time it
was installed aboard (NTSB, 2008).
Under the Captain's orders, the vessel was proceeding in automated control at
20 knots with the speed control passed to the engine room. The Captain realised that
the vessel started to perform an undemanded turning to port. Consequently and
agreeing with the advice of the Staff Captain, the Captain ordered to increase the
Rudder Limit14 from 5 degrees to 10 degrees intending to control this turning to port.
14 The Rudder Limit is a parameter that can be selected by the OOW which limit the maximum angle
of the Rudder to both sides
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(NTSB, 2008).
Without solving the problem, the Captain and Staff Captain left the bridge,
handing over the conn to the Second Officer. The Second Officer was reported on
duty on board the Crown Princess on July 2006. He spent 5 days familiarizing with
the ship and then started to perform duties as OOW. Having taking over the conn, he
realized that the vessel kept the tendency of turning to port. Then, he tried to correct
this trend switching from automated control to manual control and steering the
wheel by himself (NTSB, 2008).
Unfortunately, the Second Officer not receiving the feedback he expected in
the time he expected, he moved the wheel many times to both sides in maximum
angles. The vessel was proceeding at 20 knots. A heeling to starboard increased up to
24 degrees. This unexpected heeling angle caught crew and passengers unprepared
and as a final result almost 300 people were injured, from which 14 were considered
as serious injuries (United States' Code of Federal Regulations as cited by NTSB,
2008). The relief Captain was the first to arrive to the bridge and ordered to reduce
speed, which almost immediately solved the heeling angle and the vessel became
upright again. (NTSB, 2008)
5.2.1.- HMI aspects
1. TRAINING. The Second Officer' previous vessel was the Diamond Princess
which was equipped with a NACOS INS system, similar to that of the Crown
Princess. He had been on board the Diamond Princess for almost three weeks.
(NTSB, 2008)
According to Lutzhoft and Dekker (2002) users are provided with
mental models at the time of interacting with technology. Those mental
models are moulded by “expectations and knowledge, training and education,
and actual experience of using (the) system”(Lutzhoft & Dekker, 2002, p. 88)
on different real occasions.
60

The Second Officer declared in the accident investigation that he was
not familiar with the use of the NACOS INS 65-5 in automated control mode
because the former vessel was used in Alaskan waters where, due to icy
waters, the normal practice was to sail under manual control (NTSB,2008).
Furthermore, he had had a three days course in NACOS in 2004. He
was considered to have had all the requirements satisfied at the time of taking
over the conn.
2. FAMILIARIZATION. It cannot be said that the Second Officer was
unfamiliar with the NACOS INS; however, this familiarization was not
enough to help him in managing the situation. His 5 days of familiarization
with the vessel were registered, which can be considered to be in agreement
with the STCW and the ISM Code.
3. CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. Errors are originated from the fact that
the user of the technology or machinery, having faced a new situation with no
information or preparation available, he or she has no appropriate reaction,
consequently an error occurs (Reason, 1990). In this case the Second Officer
did not understand why the vessel was turning to port. In an intention to solve
the problem, he overrode the automation system and tried to counter react
governing the vessel manually.
Remembering Fujita & Hollnagel (2004) about the levels of control
that a user has over a situation, the Second Officer lost total control of the
situation (SCRAMBLED15). In this regards it was shown in practice what
Lutzhoft said about the fact that seafarers do not use technology in emergency
situations.
4. KNOWLEDGE OF THE TECHNOLOGY. The NACOS 65-5 allowed the
users to set determined parameters depending upon the situation. Those
parameters are the Rudder Limit, the Rudder Economy and the Course Limit.
15 See Section 3.4
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The Rudder Economy could be chosen in a range of 10 different levels and
level 5 was the selected level when the accident happened. According to the
producer of that technology, this level of Rudder Economy was thought to be
used in bad weather (NTSB, 2008). As the level was increasing in number,
the aim was to provide more flexibility to the rudder position accordingly to
the rough weather.
In the report it was established that the weather conditions were calm.
This actual setting of the Rudder Economy was not in the awareness of the
Second Officer (NTSB,2008).
Also, the system had three different modes to carry out the navigation:
Heading Mode, Course Mode and Track Mode. Heading Mode was selected
at the time of the accident, which meant that the autopilot had to follow the
course established using mainly the Gyrocompass signal (NTSB,2008).
Sam Electronics, requested by the NTSB, conducted an investigation
about the accident and concluded that “an improper Rudder Economy setting
and Rudder Limit setting can lead to a non proper function of steering in
Heading Mode for this ship’s speed of 18 to 20 knots together with the
measured water depth” (NTSB, p. 20, 2008).
It would have been better to have this information prior the accident.
5. OVER RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY. The Captain having perceived an
unexpected evolution of the vessel, did hand over the watch to the Second
Officer and left the bridge. According to the Accident Report, the Captain
expected that after having selected the new Rudder Limit, the INS would
need some time and would stabilize the course. He did not give any particular
order to the Second Officer in this regard (NTSB,2008).
According to the Accident Report, the Company had a policy
regarding when the Captain should leave the bridge, stating that the
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navigational situation should be clear. Obviously, the Captain did not appraise
any potential hazard when he left the bridge.
6. ROLES INTERACTING WITH TECHNOLOGY. According to Lutzhoft
(2004), one of the roles that a human being has to perform when interacting
with technology is monitoring, which is hampered by two main aspects.
Users tend to monitor less when the system is already installed and when the
system has been working without failures (Lutzhoft, 2004; Bainbridge, 1983).
The main reason is because they tend to over rely on the system. So did the
Captain as he declared on the Investigation Report.
7. DIFFICULTIES TO UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS HAPPENNING. In the
Report Investigation the lack of recognition of the shallow water effects is
mentioned. The Captain ordered to increase speed to 20 knots, and according
to the investigation there was not sufficient depth to avoid the shallow water
effect. Since the vessel was being steered automatically, the OOW did not
immediately recognize the loss of manoeuvring capability. This situation was
not recognize either by the NACOS INS. Electronic systems are not aware of
the surrounding situation and not embedded in the environment; this is why
they need the human intervention (Dekker. 2006; Lutzhoft, 2004).
8. THE LACK OF HMI AS A CAUSE. The causes of this accident found by
NTSB (2008) can be summarized as:


Primary cause: incorrect wheel commands by the 2nd Officer.



Contributory Cause: incorrect inputs to the system by Captain and Staff
Captain.



Contributory Cause: insufficient training in INS operation.
However, taking a look at the complete report the lack of relationship

between the OOW and the INS is notorious. Looking at what happened from
hindsight he made an incorrect decision; however, it was not what he
63

intended to do. For him, there was something that he did not understand, and
he reacted in the way he had learnt.
This accident could have been much more serious, which luckily it
was not. The vessel was according to regulations, the ship was just brand new
and the crew was all certified accordingly.

5.3.- Allision of Chemical/Oil Tanker Vessel Prospero (10
December 2006)
The Tanker Vessel Prospero was built in 2000, with 11,973 gt, capacity of
16,800 dwt and a length of 145,7 metres. It was provided with a podded propulsion
drive system called Siemens-Schottel Propulsor (SSP) that could be operated from

Figure 5: Tanker Vessel Prospero
the bridge and engine room (MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation Board, 2007).
Originally, it was possible to rotate the SSP 360 degrees. Nevertheless, at the
time of the accident could only be turned 180 degrees to both sides. This limitation
was known by the corresponding Classification Society, which had delivered a
Condition of Class. The Master was also aware of this limitation (MAIB & Swedish
Accident Investigation Board, 2007).
At 00:35 hours the vessel was intending to moor its port side alongside the
Milford Haven's jetty (UK) to load cargo. The vessel was almost empty, having only
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an over-carried cargo of 220 tons of kerosene. The BTM was composed by the
Master and the pilot. For unknown reasons, the Master did not inform the pilot about
the limitation on the Pod, and since this particular vessel was allowed to enter to
Milford Haven without tugs, so it did and the pilot agreed (MAIB & Swedish
Accident Investigation Board, 2007).
When the vessel was near to moor alongside the jetty, the Master switched the
engine control from the central console to the port console. The vessel's speed was
around 1 knot and the Master intended to increase the speed a little in order to keep
manoeuvring capability. Suddenly, the lever moved undemanded increasing the
engine power to 70%. From this moment onwards, neither the Master nor the pilot
could respond to this unexpected event successfully (MAIB & Swedish Accident
Investigation Board, 2007).
At the end, the Propulsion Control System performed some activities which
were not understood by any of both officers; resulting in two allision with the jetty,
one going ahead and one going astern, with structural damages to the vessel, pier and
jetty. Luckily enough, there was no personnel injured or loss of life and the vessel
was almost empty of cargo. No oil spill was registered.
5.3.1.- HMI aspects
1. TRAINING. The Master had been appointed on board in September 2006,
three months before the accident happened. His certificates were up to date
and he was considered to be an experienced Master. The Prospero Company
has a working system for its crew one month on and one month off. This
routine meant that the Master was doing his second trip as a Master on board
the Prospero. It was found that neither the Master nor the engineering officers
had had training in SSP.
Furthermore, the accident report identified as one safety issue that the
training requirements contained in STCW 78 as amended for engineer
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personnel were “inadequate for this type of complex plant”(MAIB & Swedish
Accident Investigation Board, 2007, p. 58). The relevance of this finding for
the present research is considered twofold. One is that the engineering
department is part of the Human Resources of the BTM (Bowditch, 2002),
because their appropriate qualifications are regarded as relevant. Second, it
pointed out that the requirements of STCW did not satisfy the current reality
of technology. In this case, the technology is at least 10 years old, and the
crew was not prepared to deal with it.
2. TECHNOLOGY DEGRADATION. The Master of Prospero could have been
victim of a latent error in this case originated from “faulty maintenance and
bad management decisions”(Reason, 1990, p. 173). There is no mention to
whether it had been a risk assessment when the system got deteriorated due to
the faulty Gauss transmitter, which limited its original capability of turning
360 degrees. The decision was to continue trading with the ship, and in this
way the risk of having an accident was taken.
Hollnagel (2007) says that sometimes, as in case of aviation, the risk
of falling down an air plane can be eliminated by cancelling the flight, but
this decision is against the proper nature of the industry; therefore, the
decision of stopping the flight is not viable, consequently other approaches to
reduce the risk of falling down the air plane are taken.
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Figure 6: The risk Bowtie model (Hollnagel, 2007, p. 223)

In the case of Prospero and looking at it from hindsight, symptoms
indicating problems with the SSP were not considered as samples of potential
failures (MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation Board, 2007).
Using the Bowtie model of causes for an accident to happen (Figure
6), it seems that the company disregarded some indication that could have
resulted in the accident; the system had had similar failures before, new
personnel was appointed on board and no training in reversionary modes of
the SSP was given to the new Master or engineer department, the Master did
not asked for tugs to help in the manoeuvre.
As is cited by Hollnagel (2007), an accident can happen due to an
undesired event originated by certain causes, and due to a faulty use of the
barriers (Reason, 1990). Barriers can be classified in functional, incorporeal,
physical and symbolic (Hollnagel, 2007). In the case of the Prospero, it seems
that no effective use of any barrier was even tried to perform. The alarm was
not acknowledged (symbolic), the use of tugs was not considered (physical),
the reversionary mode was not understood by the user (functional) and there
was no procedure written in the Safety Manual of the Company to deal with
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this kind of situation(incorporeal) (MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation
Board, 2007; Hollnagel, 2007).
3. FAMILIARIZATION. It was found by the accident investigation that the
personnel considered the SSP very reliable and comfortable to use. The crew
was familiar with operating the controls, but not with reversionary modes.
Consequently, the Master did not realize that the system triggered a
reversionary mode because of a failure on the primary propulsion system.
Furthermore, the Master did not notice an alarm indicating a failure on the
primary propulsion system (MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation Board,
2007).
4. HMI DESIGN. The accident investigation found deficiencies in the design of
alarms. The Master did not acknowledge the alarm indicating the failure of
the primary propulsion system because he did not see it. The reason found
was that the alarm light was dimmed together with the rest of the lightnings.
Also, the volume of the audible alarm was not enough to overcome the
environmental noise.
The investigation report indicated that, at the time of constructing the
Prospero, the corresponding Classification Society did not have a policy
regarding the HMI concept. Furthermore, there was no

requirement

regarding the documentation to be submitted by the technology producer
((MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation Board, 2007). This left Prospero
in the year 2000 with a complex propulsion system without an assessment on
how the interaction between the human being and technology would be with
this system.
5. CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. Not understanding the situation, the
Master literally started to fight against the control levers. He tried
unsuccessfully to reduce the engine power by pushing the lever back. After a
while, the engine power was reduced to zero without intervention of the
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Master. Nevertheless, it increased power again to 70% after a few moments.
Just after the second collision going astern, the Master passed the control of
SSP to the Engine room and back to the bridge; then, the operation became
normally again (MAIB & Swedish Accident Investigation Board, 2007).
During the reversionary mode, there was a complete lack of awareness
in what was happening by the side of the Master. (MAIB & Swedish Accident
Investigation Board, 2007).
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- Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1.- Conclusions
This investigation has concluded that it does exist a gap between technology
on the bridge and the BTM, which affects the safety operation of the latter. The gap
has its routes in problems of design and incorporation of technology without
consideration of the user's characteristics and expectations, and on the training that
the user should receive previously being appointed to operate that technology.
However, it could not be proved whether the mentioned gap is in an
increasing trend or not. Indeed, it should be said that the gap is in the awareness of
the maritime community which is trying to convince the stakeholders of its existence
and to react accordingly.
In the last three years, Quality organisations and Classification Societies are
establishing mandatory regulations regarding the introduction of ergonomics design
and HMI when designing and incorporating technology on bridges. IMO, mainly
through non-mandatory documents, has shown in latest times its concern in the issue
of HMI trying to attract attention in this matter.
Following

are

subsequent

detailed

conclusions

resulted

from

this

investigation:
1) Technology has to have a pre-designed interface created on purpose for the
future user. In the maritime industry, this aspect is particularly difficult due to
the very nature of multinational, multicultural and multilingual industry,
which signifies that people with strong differences among each other can
operate the equipment.
2) IMO considers HMI as a technical issue, an intrinsic aspect of technology
design. On the other hand, designers tend to consider wrong actions
committed by human beings as non-technical aspects of technology. These
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wrong actions can be the outcome of a variety of factors, among them it could
be a wrong designed HMI and an improper education of the user on the use of
the technology.
3) The introduction of users' characteristics and expectations, as well as
ergonomic principles, did not take place in the design of INS and IBS until
the end of the 1990s, which affected the design of the HMI. The design of the
technology provided on-board was more technology centred, provided with
some interfaces which in many cases did not satisfy the user's expectations.
Consequently, technology was not used according to its design.
4) It does exist a different philosophy between designers and users when dealing
with technology. This difference obliges the user to adapt to a tool designed
by a person with a different perspective about what technology should be able
to do and how. This drawback can be reduced by using ergonomics.
5) In the maritime industry, there is no standard mandatory provision about what
documentation and training should the technology producer deliver to the
user.
6) Users' expectations are influenced by the perception users have about
technology. There is still the same scary perception about technology which
lead to an improper use of it.
7) Technology today is less prone to be used under manual modes, which
purport a further hazard when the users prefer to operate it manually.
8) Users need to have the knowledge of technology organized which should
include more than normal simple operation. This is not the normal practice in
shipping.
9) Automation hinder the opportunities of practicing the user's skill, providing a
long time of low workload, which lets the user to be relaxed. This situation
tends to delay or cancel the reaction of the user in an emergency.
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10) Technology has introduced more layers between the user and the final
equipment which performs the task, which in turn splits the user more from
what is happening. Users can induce unintentional errors whose
consequences will be delayed in time, the so-called latent errors.
11) The Human Factors is a concept that leads to different interpretations,
therefore it has served as a term where many different things can fit into.
IMO particularly identifies as the Human Factor as the person plus the
training required by the organisation. The problem with this perception
related to the HMI is that the training on the technology does not constitute
today a requirement in any convention, besides familiarization.
12) The concept of HMI involves the interaction of human beings with
technology to perform a task. For that, HMI needs a clear understanding of
the Human Factor to be designed accordingly. If there is confusion or
ambiguousness in the terminology, a misled address to the HMI can be
executed.
13) A general trend was found of attributing every wrong happening with
technology to wrong action committed by humans, assuming human beings to
be less reliable than technology. Moreover, there is a proved tendency to
incorporate more technology in order to deal with the unreliability of the
human beings. However, INS and IBS systems do need the presence of
human beings to operate.
14) Human Error is generally considered to be a complex issue, where aspects of
human beings, situation and environment play important roles; however, IMO
has a definition of Human Error which does not specify what are the
acceptable practices or the undesirable results.
15) IMO incorporates the HRA inside the FSA in order to assess the participation
of human aspects on the overall risk, but stressing that this part of the Safety
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Assessment should not be overstressed. Furthermore, data has indicated that
the major effort of resources in the maritime industry is being done more in
technical aspects than on the human side. It seems as to be an intention of
considering the human being in the industry but at the same time not much
effort is allocated to understand it and improve its quality.
16) The techniques used in IMO to assess human reliability are being put aside in
other industries and succeeded by a second generation of HRA techniques.
These techniques are strongly criticized by ergonomic practitioners. The
second generation of HRA techniques gives to the context of use of the
technology the principal factor that determines the occurrence of error.
17) It was found that the requirements contained in SOLAS 74 regarding the
incorporation of technology on the bridge, are centralized in what technology
should be able to do, which is generally speaking, easing the task of the
Bridge Team Management. However, there is no consideration of the user's
characteristics and expectations. Therefore, it should be argued how
technology can ease the task of someone who perhaps does not understand
that technology.
18) The ISM Code and STCW 78 as amended, include the aspect of training with
technology within the broad term familiarization with the equipment, not
stating clearly how this familiarization should be done and verified. The
responsibility of the familiarization is assigned to the shipping companies.
19) In 2003, IMO started to include training considerations in its non-binding
regulations allocating the responsibility of that on the shipping companies. In
this regard, IMO has acknowledged the difficulties occurring when intending
to train in the new technology, recognising the existence of situations where
users are not provided with any training on the technology they have to
operate.
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20) In 2005, IMO recognising that special knowledge is required by the OOW to
operate IBS/INS, validated a model course for IBS/INS. This course intends
to provide foundations of these systems. However, it also needs to be
supported by a posteriori familiarization of the specific equipment, taking
into account the lack of standardization in design.
21) Last year, a proposal was submitted to revise the INS/IBS performance
standards to be included in further revisions to the SOLAS 74 Convention.
The document underlines the advantages of using INS/IBS. However, these
systems still need an efficient interaction with the OOW in order to really
show those advantages. Still how to educate and train the OOW on the new
technology remain to be regulated.
22) It was found that the concept of HMI was not considered by some
stakeholders in the maritime industry at the beginning of this decade. Vessels
built at that time are still operating.
23) The BTM performance depends upon how the OOW operates the technology
applied. Some examples are showing that there is a real lack of knowledge by
the OOW and Masters regarding the features of technology. Still, it can not be
said that this shortfall has caused serious damage; however, the case of
Crown Princess shows a clear example of the hazard that the lack of
knowledge of technology from the users signifies.

6.2.- Recommendations


To address appropriately the problem of the gap between technology and
users, it would be highly necessary to review certain fundamentals concepts
such as Human Factor, Human Element and Human Error. For that, it is
recommended that experience from other hazardous industries be taken. In
this regard, the Appendix A with the adaptation of the check list used in the
petrochemical industry, provided to the MEPC in 2005, provides a good
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guideline to follow.


Since the trend of incorporating technology will not stop but otherwise, it is
necessary to train the OOW as soon as possible. It is recommended that the
Model Course regarding operation of IBS/INS be included as part of the
mandatory requirement in the STCW 78 as amended for Masters and OOW.
However, IMO should have to consider how to manage the simulators
requirements for this course. Simulators are assets that are not available by all
Flag States and represent a high investments for MET institutions.



It is also recommended that IMO reviews and clarifies the term
familiarization. Familiarization with technology is a very broad term. There
are cases showing personnel that had had familiarization time but did not
know how to use the technology. So far the familiarization is allocated as a
Company responsibility, so it is recommended that it should be kept like this,
but a way of controlling this aspect should be found.



The SOLAS 74 Convention is needed for an update regarding the current
reality of technology on the bridge. It is recommended that a revision of
Chapter V of SOLAS be carried out considering the new revision of
performance standards for IBS and INS, which also include more
consideration to the user in the design of this technology.
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Appendix A (IMO, 2005b)
Checklist for Consideration of the Human Element in the Work Program of IMO Committees, SubCommittees, Working Rroups, Correspondence Groups
Instructions
1 This checklist should be completed prior to finalization of development and/or amendment of mandatory
and non-mandatory IMO instruments. Member States are encouraged to complete this checklist when
proposing new instruments and amendments
2 If the answer to any of the question below is:
(A) YES, the preparing body should provide supporting details and/or recommendation for further work.
NO, the preparing body should make proper justification as to why human element issues were not
(B) considered.
© NA (Not Applicable) – no further action needed.
Solution Being Assessed for Human Element System Integration
Responsible Body: Committee, Sub-Committee, Working Group, Correspondence Group, Member State
1 Was the human element considered in this the development and amendment of this □Yes □No □NA
solution?
2 Was the relationship of this solution to existing human element related instruments □Yes □No □NA
considered? (Identify instruments considered in comments section)
3 Have human element solutions been made as an alternative and/or in conjunction with □Yes □No □NA
technical solutions?
4 Has human element guidance on the application and/or implemantation of the proposed □Yes □No □NA
solution been provided for the following:
_ Administrations? _ Ship owners/managers _ Seafarers? _Surveyors?
□Yes □No □NA
5 At some point, before final adoption, has the solution been reviewed or considered by a □Yes □No □NA
relevant IMO body woth relevant human element expertise?
6 Does the solution address safeguards to avoid single person errors?
□Yes □No □NA
7 If the solution is to be directed at seafarers, is the information presented in a form that is □Yes □No □NA
both comprehensible and presentable?
Have
human element experts been consulted in development of the solution?
□Yes □No □NA
8
HUMAN
ELEMENT
INTEGRATION
DOMAINS:
Has
the
solution
been
assessed
against
each domain
9
below? This assessment should include (1) identification of affects; (2) risks of the affects; and (3) how
the risks will be managed. The assessment should consider relevant affects upon passengers, crew, and
ship owners/managers.
□ MANPOWER. The number of qualified personnel required and available to safely □Yes □No □NA
operate, maintain, support, and provide training for system.
□ PERSONNEL. Personnel or human factors are the necessary human aptitudes (i.e., □Yes □No □NA
cognitive, physical, and sensory capabilities), knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience
levels that are needed to properly perform job tasks.
□ Cognitive requirem ents address the human's capability to evaluate and process information (i.e.
response time).

□

Physical requirem ents are typically stated as anthropometric (measurements of the human
body), strength, and weight factors.

□ Sensory requirem ents are typically visual, olfactory (smell), or hearing factors.
□ TRAINING. The process and tools by which personnel acquire or improve the □Yes □No □NA
necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to achieve desired job/task performance.
□ SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH. The safety management system □Yes □No □NA
procedures, policies, training, documentation, equipment, etc. to properly manage
personnel safety and health risks?
□ Safety factors are those system factors that minimizse t he potential for mishaps causing death
□

or injury or theraten t he operation of the system.
Occupational health factors are those system factors that minimize the risk of personnel injury,
acute/chronic illness, or disability; and/or reduce job performance.
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Checklist for consideration of the Human Element
□ HABITABILITY. Living and working conditions that are necessary to sustain the
morale, safety, health, and comfort of those on board. Beyond providing acceptable
quality of life, habitability affects crew endurance, fatigue and alertness. Consideration
should include but not be limited to noise, vibration, lighting, climate, and
accommodation areas.
□ PERSONNEL SURVIVABILITY. System features that reduce the risk of illness, injury, or
death in a catastrophic event such as fire, explosion, spill, collision, flooding, or
intentional attack. The assessment should consider desired human performance in
emergency situations for detection, response, evacuation, survival and rescue and the
interface with emergency procedures, systems, facilities and equipment.
□ HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING. Designing human-machine, or more appropriately,
human-system interface consistent with the physical, cognitive, and sensory abilities of
the user population.
□ Functional interfaces: Allocation of functions and tasks – role of the human
versus automation. Manning levels, skills, and training. Objective: Ability to
perform tasks within time and accuracy constraints.
□ Informational interfaces: Information that provides the human with the knowledge,
understanding and awareness of what is happening in the system. Information
media, electronic, hard copy Objective: Ability to identify, obtain, integrate,
understand, interpret, apply, and disseminate information.
□ Environmental interfaces: Physical, phychologi8cal and operational environments.
Natural and artificial environments, environmental controls, and facility design.
Objective: Ability to perform under adverse environmental stress, including
heat/cold, clothing/PPE, vibration, reduced visibility, weather, time constraints and
psychological stress.
□ Co operational interfaces: Team cooperation, collaboration, and communication
among members and others. Objective: Ability to maintain performance over time.
□ Organizational interfaces: Job design, management/organizational structure,
command authority, policies and regulations. Objective: Ability to perform jobs,
tasks, and functions within management/organizational structure. Should also
include interface with contractors, partners, suppliers, customers, competitors,
community, regulators, professional organizations and labour organizations.
□ Operational interfaces: Such as procedures, documentation, workloads, job aids.
Objective:Ability to maintain performance over time.
□ Cognitive interfaces: Decision rules, decision support systems, provision for
maintaining situation awareness, mental models of the operational environment,
provisions for knowledge generation, cognitive skills and attitudes, memory aids.
Objective: Ability to perform problem solving, decision-making, information
integration, and situational awareness
□ enable and facilitate effective and safe human performance and interaction.
Includes controls, displays, workstations, work sites, accesses, labels, signs,
structures, steps and ladders, handholds, maintenance provisions, etc. Objective:
Ability to perform operations/maintenance using controls, displays, equipment,
tools, etc.
Comments: (1) Justification for NO Answers. (2) Recommendations for additional human element
assessment needed. (3) Key risk management strategies employed. (4) Other comments. (5)
Supporting documentation.

Assessment Team: Name/Position
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Appendix B (IMO, 1998c)
Management
(Ashore and aboard)
! Policy
! Safety culture
! Motivation
! Communication links
! Responsibility
! Authority
! Work planning
! Contingency planning
! Emergency response
! Manuals
! Procedures
! Instructions
! Work methods
! Checklists
! Education and Training
Work Environment/conditions
(aboard ship)
! Hazardous materials
! Man-machine interface
! Personnel protection
! Physical hazards
! Hours of work
! Hours of rest
! Fatigue
! Estimated workload5
! Actual marine environment
! Living conditions

Technical
(The vessel and/or its equipment)
! Design
! Ergonomics
! Manufacture/construction
! Installation
! Initial and periodic testing
! Approval
! Maintenance
! Repairs
! Modifications
! Renewals
! Expected marine environment1
! Operations2
Manning
(Master and crew of the vessel)
! Qualifications
! Number of crew members
! Composition of crew
! Culture3
! Working Language
! Medical Conditions
! Competence
Training
(Ashore and aboard)
! Basic Safety Training
! Familiarization
! Drills
! Extended safety training
! Training of personnel ashore
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